USA v. Shawn Hilliard by unknown
2018 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-14-2018 
USA v. Shawn Hilliard 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Shawn Hilliard" (2018). 2018 Decisions. 192. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018/192 
This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2018 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 17-1340 
________________ 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
  
SHAWN HILLIARD, 
 
       Appellant 
 
     ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-14-cr-00134-001) 
District Judge: Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 6, 2018 
 
Before: MCKEE, AMBRO, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed March 14, 2018) 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
The Government prosecuted Shawn Hilliard for engaging in a scheme that 
defrauded several FDIC-insured banks.  He pled guilty to one count of bank fraud in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344; one count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; 
and six counts of aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1028A.   
The District Court sentenced him to 126 months’ imprisonment and ordered him 
to pay $1,375,125.12 in restitution.  It found he joined the conspiracy while he was on 
parole for an unrelated state offense.  It also concluded he was responsible for the total 
loss amount associated with the conspiracy.   
Hilliard appeals, challenging his sentence and restitution award.  He contends the 
Court erred in finding that he joined the conspiracy while he was on parole.  He also 
contests the Court’s conclusions regarding the specific loss amount attributable to him.   
“We review the [D]istrict [C]ourt’s factual decisions regarding . . . criminal 
history calculations . . . for clear error,” United States v. Audinot, 901 F.2d 1201, 1202 
(3d Cir. 1990), and “exercise plenary review over the . . . Court’s interpretation and 
application of the Guidelines,” United States v. Zabielski, 711 F.3d 381, 386 (3d Cir. 
2013).  Even if the Court erred, however, “we may . . . uphold its sentence if the error 
was harmless.”  Id.  We review the restitution award and the sentence’s substantive 
reasonableness for abuse of discretion.  See United States v. Turner, 718 F.3d 226, 235 
(3d Cir. 2013) (restitution award); United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 
2009) (en banc) (substantive reasonableness).  
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We part with the District Court’s finding that Hilliard joined the conspiracy before 
his parole expired, and, based on the record before us, we have concerns about the 
adequacy of the support for the restitution award and loss amount.  Accordingly, we 
vacate and remand those rulings.  
In making the finding that Hilliard joined the conspiracy before his parole expired 
in October 2012, the Court credited the statements of Rosa Samuels, a co-conspirator 
who stated she was working for Hilliard when she was arrested on August 7, 2012.  
These statements, however, were inconsistent with her post-arrest statement, where she 
told police her accomplice was named “Rick” and described him as “a short, Hispanic 
male.”  Gov’t Br. at 36.  The Government admits Samuels’ post-arrest statement 
“indisputably [does] not fit the description of Hilliard, who is a very tall African-
American male.”  Id.  While Samuels attempted to reconcile her statements by stating 
that she called Hilliard “Rick,” none of the evidence shows she used that nickname 
during the conspiracy.  Nor does the evidence reflect that the other co-conspirators 
referred to Hilliard as “Rick.”  In this context, with testimony that is not coherent and 
plausible, there is not enough evidence to find that Hilliard joined the conspiracy while 
he was on parole.  See United States v. Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 441 (3d Cir. 1997).   
Moreover, what occurred was not harmless because it increased Hilliard’s final 
Guidelines range.  See United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2008).  
Although the District Court stated it would still impose a 126-month sentence even if it 
“redid things to [Hilliard’s] benefit,” J.A. at 365, the record does not unambiguously 
demonstrate that “the sentencing judge would have imposed the same sentence under a 
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correct Guidelines range,” Langford, 516 F.3d at 216.  Hence we must vacate and remand 
even in view of the Court’s statements during sentencing.  
Turning to the restitution amount, the Guidelines provide that a defendant is 
responsible for “all acts and omissions of others that were . . . reasonably foreseeable in 
connection with [the jointly undertaken] criminal activity.”  U.S.S.G. 
§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)(iii) (emphasis added).  Consistent with the Guidelines, courts must 
conduct “a searching and individualized inquiry into the circumstances surrounding each 
defendant’s involvement in the conspiracy. . . .”  United States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985, 
995 (3d Cir. 1992).  Here, the District Court stated that Hilliard was “in for a penny and 
for a pound if [his co-conspirators] . . . did any act . . . in pursuance of the object of the 
conspiracy.”  J.A. at 325.  This is not enough for us to determine what Hilliard’s actual 
restitution award should be.  See United States v. Fallon, 470 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 
2006) (“Restitution should not be ordered in respect to a loss which would have occurred 
regardless of the defendant’s conduct.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Accordingly, 
we vacate the restitution order and remand for a new restitution hearing.     
To the extent the Court’s loss calculation affected Hilliard’s sentence, the parties 
dispute whether the error is harmless.  Hilliard admits his base offense level would be the 
same under his proposed loss calculation, $690,640, and the Court’s loss calculation, 
$1,375,125.12.  See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(H)-(I) (stating that the increase in base 
offense level is the same for losses between $550,000 and $1,500,000).  However, 
Hilliard also argues that, when imposing its sentence, the Court relied on the “nearly $1.4 
million of losses that were caused by the conspiracy,” J.A. at 356, a point the 
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Government acknowledges, see Gov’t Br. at 40 (“At sentencing, the [D]istrict [C]ourt 
took into account the fraud loss . . . .”).  On remand, the District Court will necessarily 
recalculate the loss amount per our holding on the restitution amount.  Hence we need not 
reach the question of whether the error in calculating the loss amount is harmless. 
Finally, we conclude Hilliard’s sentence was not substantively unreasonable in 
relation to the lenient sentences his co-conspirators received.  Although courts must 
consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with 
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), 
a “[d]isparity of sentence between co-defendants does not of itself show an abuse of 
discretion,” United States v. Cifuentes, 863 F.2d 1149, 1156 n.5 (3d Cir. 1988).  We have 
held § 3553(a)(6) “plainly applies only where co-defendants are similarly situated.”  
United States v. Parker, 462 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2006).  Here Hilliard’s co-
conspirators, Antonio and Tito Clemente, received downward variances based on their 
post-offense rehabilitation efforts.  Hilliard, by contrast, did not engage in the same 
efforts.  Instead, he attempted to avoid a positive drug test, absconded from pretrial 
supervision, and lied about his identity when he was apprehended.  Nothing on this issue 
even remotely suggests an abuse of discretion.   
Thus we vacate and remand the sentence based on the Court’s finding that Hilliard 
was on parole when he joined the conspiracy.  We also vacate the restitution award and 
loss amount and remand for resentencing.  We affirm otherwise. 
